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Integrating risk analysis into public policymaking

By John F. Ahearne

JOHN F. AHEARNE is the executive director of Sigma Xi, the Scientific Reseach Society, and adjunct scholar at Resources for the Future in Washington, D.C. This article is based on a talk given at the Electric Power Reseach Institute — Stanford Symposium in honour of Dr. Chauncy Starr’s 80th birthday.

1 Public policies involve issues in which governmental or private actions affect a significant segment of the general public. Because these actions often engender a certain amount of risk for that segment, the

questions arise: Does, can, and should risk analysis affect public policy? The answer to all of these questions is «yes». Risk analysis should and does affect public policy. Unfortunately, often the risk analyses that don’t, should; and those that should, don’t.

2 Some of the public policy issues for which risk analysis could, should, or may be important include how to dispose of low-level radioactive waste, where to storehigh-level radioactive waste, and what controls should be placed on energy production. Other such topics are the disposal of hazardous wastes;

constraints on the use of pesticides; the impacts of smokingboth active and passive; the export of tobacco; the use of animals in medical research; and the allocation of public resources to address these and other problems. The use of risk analyses in setting public policy concerning these topics is complicated, however,

by the level of understanding among government officials and the public, the influence of the media, and the impacts on resource allocation. These issues are critical as society wrestles with rapid scientific and technological change amidst growing concerns about environmental and health impacts. New approaches,

developed by involving a wide range of people, are needed to help science and society.

Public Understanding and Opinion

First, for risk analysis to have a positive impact on public policy, the public and officials must have an understanding of technical matters. Jon Miller, who does surveys for the National Science Board, has spent

more than 10 years assessing what he has described as the scientific literacy of the U.S. public. His definition of scientific literacy has three elements: a basic vocabulary of scientific terms and concepts sufficient to be able to read science news, newspapers, and magazines and to understand «McNeil Lehrer

Newshour» and «Nightline»; an understanding of the process of science, or the difference between knowing something scientifically and other ways of knowing; and an awareness of the impact of science and technology on individuals and on society. The data Miller has collected support the view, and the

National Science Board has concluded, that, according to this description of scientific literacy, much of the U.S. public is lacking the necessary understanding. For example, the 1990 survey asked U.S. adults: Does the Earth go around the sun, or does the sun go around the Earth? Twenty percent said the sun goes around

the Earth. Of those who concluded that the Earth goes around the sun, 20 percent said it goes around the sun once a day. Miller also asked whether the earliest humans lived at the same time as dinosaurs. In the

United States, 36 percent of those polled said «yes»-a much larger percentage than in Britain or West Germany. Eighteen percent said they did not know. Miller ascribes the high percentage of affirmative answers to the «Flintstone effect».

However, there have been positive signs. For several years, Miller has been asking: Would you say

that astrology is very scientific, sort of scientific, or not at all scientific? The percentage of people saying that astrology is not at all scientific has gradually risen from 50 percent in 1979 to 60 percent in 1988. This percentage is at least double that in France and almost double that in West Germany.

    5 Another indication of the level of public understanding is seen in polls on nuclear power issues. A question in the nuclear industry has been how to describe the new nuclear power plants to the public. In particular, the nuclear industry needs to describe the plants so that the public understands that one

characteristic of these new designs is a reduction in the probability of a severe accident. Announcing that the plants have a core melt frequency of 10-6 is probably not going to go a long way toward convincing the public. Therefore, the industry has been searching for more descriptive language. In a survey, people were

asked to pick out the terms that «mean something good to you». Many of the phrases that the nuclear industry suggested did not captivate the public. For example, only 9 percent of the public thought

transparently safe meant something good; 10 percent thought passively safe was good; 26 percent thought inherently safe and walkaway safe were good. Walkaway safe means that hours, even days, would pass before damage leading to the release of radiation could occur after a serious accident, which allows

operators time to think through their options carefully before taking action. Much of the public, however, thougt that walkaway safe meant that one could walk away from the accident instead of running away. Safer received almost one-half of the votes. Although there is little expectation that many new plants will

be described as being safer than the current plants, the results of the survey do provide some confidence in the public’s judgment because they indicate that the public is focused on substance — improving safety —not on style — what terminology is used.

Nevertheless, inconsistencies continue in the development of public understanding of risks, and the

issue must be faced by anyone working on risk analysis and public policy. It is not enough merely to do the technical analysis of an accident or hazard sequence, which a technical person might believe is most important. Public policy and risk analysis demand more. However, it is very difficult to determine exactly

what is driving public opinion. For example, recent polls in North Carolina asked whether the public is too concerned with the environment. Two-thirds of the people either mostly or completely disagreed. When

asked which they would choose for their state — more jobs or stricter environmental laws — how-100 ever, 75 percent of the people either mostly or completely agreed with choosing jobs over stricter environmental laws. At the same time, North Carolina is the compact state that was chosen to develop a low-level radioactive waste site to replace the one in Barnwell, South Carolina. Not surprisingly, North

Carolina has been unable to find a site. A survey asked the public whether they supported the following statement: «Whatever the cost, North Carolina needs to get out of the agreement with the neighboring

states regarding placing the radioactive waste site in our state.» More than half the people agreed that North Carolina ought to get out of the agreement. They want the jobs, but they also want out of the agreement.

This type of inconsistency is not restricted to radioactive waste disposal sites. In an effort to locate a

 hazardous waste incinerator in North Carolina, an incinerator company convinced Woodland’s town officials to accept the incinerator. Shortly thereafter, a town election was held:

Aroused opponents of a proposed hazardous waste incinerator voted in a new slate of town officials

Tuesday, replacing the Mayor and four Council memebers who invited ThermalKEM to their town.

The defeated mayor had been in office for 27 years. Voter turnout was 89 percent. The interest was so high that, rather than going home after voting, many voters stayed at the votecounting center. The crowd

125 greeted the results by chanting, «Not here, not there, not anywhere!»

Although addressing the U.S. public is difficult, this nation’s public may not be the most difficult. In fall 1991, at a workshop sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Yves Kaluzney, head of the

nuclear division of the General Directorate for Energy and Raw Materials in the government of France, discussed the problems France has had in trying to establish a site for high-level radioactive waste. The process had to be halted and a parliamentary commission established because of local objections. After a

U.S. participant in the DOE conference suggested that the two sides ought to enter into dialogue, Kaluzney said, «When you have people putting fire to your documents, throwing stones through your windows, breaking your computers, that is opposition—that is not dialogue».

9 Risk analysis and public policy often are in conflict on nuclear power issues. Physicist Richard Wilson, who has been involved in risk analysis across a broad spectrum of fields, once described how he got into the nuclear field:

It didn’t take long for me to realize that the problems, and even the issues of nuclear energy [have] very little to do with nuclear physics. The problems are of engineering and perception. While I agree with much that they say, I reject the idea that the public perception of risk is more important than the actual magnitude

150 of the risk. The perceptions can change rapidly — the risk itself stays the same. Of course, we do not know the risk itself. All we know is the perception of that risk by an expert. But some people reject experts.

10 Another active proponent in the nuclear field also has commented on the difficulty of dealing with

perceptions. Bernard Cohen, professor of nuclear physics and radiation health at the University of Pittsburgh, wrote:

«The American public must be educated on these matters [health, safety, and economics of nuclear

160 power]. He noted the difficulty he has had in trying to get across the concept of radiation damage to humans and of levels of acceptable exposure.

The Role of the Media

11 Are the media the problem? Have the risk analyses been done well, but have the media described

them poorly? Is it the media who are really at fault in the difficulty that risk analysis have in getting analyses accepted? Philip Abelson, in an editorial in «Science», seemed to blame the media when he wrote: «When mentioned by the media, the polychlorinated biphe-nyls (PCBs) are described as cancercausing

chemicals. A more precise statement would be that huge daily lifelong doses of some of the PCBs are cancer'causing in rats».

12 Several years ago, the National Research Council Committe on Risk Perception and Communication

addressed the question of whether the media are really the heart of the problem: «It is mistaken to view journalists and the media always as significant, independent causes of problems in risk communication». The committee did note that «most news organizations would not tolerate sports or business reporting by reporters who do not understand the subject.

180      ... The same is not always true of the reporting of the technical and social dimensions of risk messages.» However, the committee advised:

What is needed are ways to improve risk communication by helping scientists and decision-makers

185 understand how and why journalists do their work and by helping journalists understand how scientists and decision-makers think and interact.

THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT

13 Where, then, can solutions be found to effectively apply risk analysis to public policy? The public is

struggling with  some inconsistencies but perhaps becoming more scientifically literate, and the media cannot be counted on, although they should not be blamed. Perhaps one should look to the U.S. Congress. Unfortunately, Congress is probably not the right place to look for the solutions. In March 1992, Senator

Warren Rudman (R-N.H.) spoke in the Senate. He was not talking about the kind of risk analysis addressed here, but what he said is germane:

We are unable, institutionally, to do what has to be done. We are literally not watching the fiddler fiddle

200 while Rome burns, we are watching the entire orchestra.

This is similar to a recent description of the DOE: «They are economic with the truth».

COST OF REGULATION

   14 Difficulties in estimating and explaining risks can lead to misallocation of resources. Perhaps the government and the public are not 'accurately identifying the most serious risks. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), although it appropriately gets many criticisms, has tried to force agencies

to estimate how much their regulations cost per life saved or health effect prevented. In the fiscal-year 1992 budget, 0MB estimated the costs of some EPA regulations. In 1990 dollars per premature death prevented, the estimates from 1980 to the present range from $100,000 for regulations on unvented space

heaters, automobile seat belts, and underground construction standards to $6 trillion for regulations on wood-preserving chemicals. Although the $6 trillion could be a miscalculation or an exaggeration, the 16 other regulations ranged from $13 million to $650 million and 3 were greater than $4 billion. One might

say OMB is'politically driven to provide one-sided data. Therefore, consider estimates by the Center for Risk Analysis of the Harvard School of Public Health. The center's 1991 annual report included estimates in 1990 dollars of the expenditures per year of life saved. The report noted that for childhood measles

vaccinations and for the phasing out of unleaded gasoline, the cost was negative — society «made money» by these actions. Safety rules at underground construction sites were estimated to cost $52,000 per year of life saved; front seat airbags in new cars, about $11,000; and dioxin effluent controls at paper mills, almost $6 million».

230    16 There are regulations that seem to be skewed. Economists at Resources for the Future (RFF) have addressed the cost-effectiveness of regulations, particularly the costs and benefits of the changes to the Clean Air Act.

MORE RESEARCH NEEDED

17 Although this issue of risk communication with the public has been studied for decades, many important questions need serious study. The National Research Council Committee on Risk Perception

and Communication spent two years examining what is known about how to communicate effectively with the public. The committee concluded that several areas needed further research:

* — Comparability — When are risks similar enough to be compared? In trying to understand risk,

245 many people try to do a risk comparison. There needs to be research on what key factors enable a risk to be compared and on the dimension that risks should not be compared across. Comparisons are often used to justify actions by inappropriately comparing voluntary risks with imposed risks.

250      * — The comprehension of magnitudes — How do different ways of presenting the magnitudes affect people's understanding of, or feel for, the size of the risks? This is an issue analysts

  and the public struggle with, particularly as they try to address probabilities that are quite small, such as one in a million.

255   * — Mental models — How do people think about the risk decisions that confront them? The information available on a risk is useful only if people can incorporate it into their thinking about the risk and its management.

* — Risk literacy — How can people learn the language and concepts needed to understand risk

statements? Is there important preparation that could significantly improve understanding?

These are researchable questions, and work should be done on them.

     18 Finally, if public understanding is important, the technical people who understand these issues must work harder to communicate: they must work harder to provide clear risk analyses to the decision makers in agencies, in industry, and in Congress. Technical people do have credibility. They also have a

responsibility. This responsibility can be summarized in the words of Thomas Jefferson:

I know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the 280 society, but the people themselves, and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is

275 not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion by education.

From: Environment, 1994, Volume 35, Number 2.