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Climate change

All debates about regional water supplies assume that natural water availability in the future will not

change and that flows will be subject only to natural variations. In fact, this assumption may no longer be true because of possible changes in the global climate. Global climate change could affect water availability in many ways, though the precise nature of such changes is still obscure. Climate change could

either increase or decrease overall water availability in different times and in different places. Estimates of changes in temperature and precipitation patterns in the Middle East are mixed: average temperatures may rise between 3 and 6 С if the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide doubles, but precipitation

projections show little consistency across different climate models, reflecting the difficulty of accurately modeling precipitation and the uncertainty about regional model results. Hydrologists expect higher temperatures to lead to substantial increases in evaporation in the region, which would decrease overall

water supply and increase demand. Despite the limited abilityof the current models to project future conditions accurately, even slight decreases in longterm water availability would place severe political strains on the region, as was seen from 1979 to 1988, when a drought reduced the average runoffin the Nile

by only 10 percent. Although the nature of future climate changes in the region cannot be predicted with confidence, there are indications that long-term decreases in flow exceeding 10 percent are possible. Some preliminary modeling of the Nile basin suggests that Nile runoff would decrease by as much as 25 percent

under some plausible conditions, and seasonal flows may experience even more significant changes. Ironically, the possibility of increases in runoff during the snowmelt season raises the specter of increased frequency of severe flooding, as was experienced in Sudan in 1988.

Future climate changes effectively make obsolete all old assumptions about the behavior of water supply. Perhaps the greatest certainty about future climate change is that the future will not look like the recent past. Changes are certainly coming, and, by the turn of the century, many of these changes may

already be apparent. The challenge is to identify those cases in which conflicts are likely to be exacerbated and to reduce the probability and consequences of those conflicts.

 

  Reducing Conflicts over Water

There is no single solution to the Middle East's water problems, and, ultimately, a combination of

efforts and in novative ideas must be applied. Formal political agreements will have to be negotiated to apportion and manage the shared surface — and groundwater in the region, particularly in the Jordan and Euphrates river basins and the occupied territories. Unless all of the people who depend on the resources

concerned are included in these agreements, conflicts will remain. In particular, definitions of equitable utilization of the existing water resources must be negotiated and applied. Difficult decisions must also be

made to prioritize water use within each country. Israel, like California and many other parts of the world, is wrestling with the conflicts between urban and rural water demands and between the agricultural and domestic sectors. Jordan is trying to improve its water-use efficiency so that it, like Israel, can make better

use of its limited supplies. And all parties are exploring ways of increasing supply within serious economic and environmental constraints. Sharing of expertise, opening access to hydrologic data, and exploring joint water conservation and supply projects offer the best opportunities for reducing the risk of future tensions over-water in the Middle East.

165      NEW SUPPLIES

l.The traditional reaction to resourse pressures is to focus on how to increase supplies, and this is true in the Middle East as well. There are two principal ways to increase supplies: bring in outside sources of

170 water and capture unused portions of the current supply to building reservoirs to store flows during wet periods for use during dry periods. Many ideas for developing new sources in the Middle East have been proposed, including building desalination plants to make freshwater out of seawater or brackish water;

175 constructing enormous pipelines to divert underused rivers in Turkey or Pakistan to the parched regions of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf; tankering or towing enormous bags of freshwater to coastal areas; laying aqueducts from the Mediterranean Sea or the Red Sea to the Dead Sea to generate electricity and

180 desalinate saltwater; and building new reservoirs on major rivers to increase storage for dry periods.

All of these proposals are controversial, and all have uncertain economic and environmental costs. In addition, political disputes over who would control the sources of some of these options make the

 construction of new facilities extremely unlikely in the absence of a lasting political settlement. On the other hand, some new sources of supply may eventually be developed as the economic value of water rises and as demands grow:

— Desalination — Ninety-seven percent of the water on the planet is too salty to drink or to grow crops. This had led to great interest in devising ways of removing salt from water in the hope of providing unlimited supplies of freshwater. Indeed, by the beginning of 1990, there were more than 7,500 facilities

worldwide producing more than 13,2 million cubic meters of freshwater per day. More than half of this desalination capacity is in the Persian Gulf region, where inexpensive fossil fuels provide the energy necessary to run the plants. For other regions, however, the high energy cost of desalination continues to

make unlimited freshwater supplies an elusive goal. In the long run, the use of desalination will be limited by the amount and cost of the energy required to purify saltwater. Unless unanticipated major technical advances reduce overall energy requirements or the price of energy drops substantially, large-scale

desalination will always be limited to extremely water-poor and energy-rich regions.

Peace Pipelines — Various proposals have been presented for pipelines to transfer water from Turkey to the Middle East and the countries around the Persian Gulf. Nicknamed the «Peace Pipeline»,

such a project would take water from the Seyhan and Ceyhan Rivers in southern Turkey as far south as Jidda and Mecca in Saudi Arabia and as far east as Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates. Along the way, water could be delivered to Damascus, Amman, Kuwait, and Israel. One version of the Peace Pipeline

 would deliver more than 1,000 million cubic meters of water per year, but little real progress has come of the various proposals. In part, the Arabs, particularly the Saudis, and the Israelis fear the political dominance of Turkey or the possible interference of other states across which the pipeline would pass.

Other Out-Of-Basin Transfers — There have been many other proposals to transfer water to the Middle East from basins where surplus water may be available. Such transfers could be accomplished via pipelines, aqueducts, tankers, floating bags, and even towing icebergs. Among the projects proposed have

 been pipelines from Baluchistan across the gulf to the United Arab Emirates, from the Euphrates in Iraq to Jordan, and from the Nile through El Arish to the Gaza and Negev to alleviate the severe water crisis in the

Gaza Strip. Each of these projects depends on the long-term availability of surplus water and the political, economic, and environmental feasibility of transferring that water. Similarly, it has been proposed that Israel and Jordan purchase water from the Litani River in Lebanon, build a short pipeline and set of

pumping plants, and move water to northern Israel, the West Bank, and Jordan. While Litani River water is used for hydroelectricity, some surplus is currently thought to be available if the economic and political price is right.

3. Moving water by tankers or by towing «trains» of bags filled with freshwater is also being explored

for supplying coastal areas. For the Gaza Strip, where overpumping of limited groundwater supplies is leading to saltwater intrusion, such alternatives may prove feasible, though technical and political obstacles still must be removed.

— Med-Dead or Red-Dead Canal — Another alternative that has been suggested in various forms is to bring large quantities of seawater from the Mediterranean Sea or the Red Sea to the Dead Sea, which lies well below sea level. The large elevation drop would permit the generation of hydroelectricity, which in

 turn could be used to satisfy the energy requirements of a desalination plant. The freshwater provided by such a system could be allocated to Israel, the occupied territories, or western Jordan, where it would reduce pressures on the limited water supplies in those regions. Brine from the desalination process or

additional seawater could be diverted into the Dead Sea to help raise its level, which has dropped nearly 20 meters over the last several decades because of the use of the Jordan River — its only inflow. Many different schemes and locations have been presented for such canals, and more work is needed to explore

the best routes, the best allocation of water, and the many complicated environmental and economic uncertainties posed by such projects.

 

VI. Politics and International Law

International water law and institutions have important roles to play despite the fact that no

satisfactory water law has been developed that is acceptable to all nations. Developing such agreements is difficult because of the many intricacies of international politics, national practices, and other complicating political and social factors. For nations sharing river basins, factors affecting the successful negotiation and

implementation or international agreements include wheter a nation is upstream, downstream, or sharing a river as a border; the relative military and economic strength of the nation; and the availability of other sources of water supply.

2. In the last few decades, however, international organizations have attempted to derive more general principles and new concepts governing shared freshwater resources. The International Law Association's Helsinki Rules of 1966 (since modified) and the work of the international Law Commission of the United

Nations are among the most important examples. In 1991, the International Law Commission completed the drafting and provisional adoption of 32 articles on the law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. Among the general principles set forth are those of equitable utilization, the

obligation not to cause harm to otherriparian nations, and the obligation to exchange hydrologic and other relevant data and information on a regular basis. Questions remain, however, about the principles' relative importance and means of enforcement. In particular, defining equitable utilization of a shared water supply

290 remains one of the most important and difficult problems facing many nations.

    3. Until now, individual water treaties covering river basins have been more effective, albeit on a far more limited regional basis, than the broader principles described by the International Law Commission.

International treaties concerning shared freshwater resources extend back centuries, and there are hundreds of international river treaties covering everything from navigation to water quality to water rights allocations. For example, freedom of navigation was granted to a monastery in Europe in the year 805, and

a bilateral treaty on the Weser River, which today flows through Germany into the North Sea, was signed in 1221. Such treaties have helped reduce the risk of water conflicts in many areas, but some of them are beginning to fail as changing levels of development alter the water needs of regions and nations. The 1959

treaty on the Nile River and some limited bilateral agreements on the Euphrates between Iraq and Syria and between Iraq and Turkey, for example, are now under pressure because of changes in the political and resource situations in the regions.

4.To make both regional treaties and broader international agreements over water more flexible, detailed mechanisms for conflict resolution and negotiations must be developed, basic hydrologic data must be acquired and shared with all parties, flexible rather than fixed water allocations are needed, and strategies

for sharing shortages and apportioning responsibilities for floods must be developed before shortages become an important factor. For example, both the 1944 Colorado River treaty between the United States and Mexico and the 1959 treaty on the Nile River between Egypt and Sudan allocate fixed quantities of

water, which are based on assumptions about the total average flows of each river. However, mistaken estimates of average flows or future climate changes that could alter flows prove this type of allocation to be too rigid and prone to disputes. Proportional sharing agreements, if they include agreements for openly

sharing all hydrologic data, can help to reduce the risk of conflicts over water, and modifications to these treaties should be undertaken by their signatories now, before such flow changes become evident.

5.Existing institutions appear sufficient to design and implement the kinds of conflict resolution

330 mechanisms designed above, but some major improvements in them are needed. The United Nations has played an important role, through the International Law Commission, in developing guidelines and principles for internationally shared watercourses, but it should continue to press for the adoption and

335 application of the principles in water-tense regions, such as the Jordan and Euphrates river basins. Similarly, bilateral or multilateral river treaties have been effective in the past, but they should consistently include all affected parties; establish joint management committees empowered to negotiate disputes; and

340 be flexible enough to adapt to long-term changes in hydrologic conditions, such as those that may result from global climate change. Finally, disputes over shared groundwater resources are particularly important in the Middle East. However, international groundwater law and principles are poorly developed. Some

345 recent progress has been made, but more attention should be given to this matter in the context of the Middle East.

Toward Peace and Cooperation.

For all of the countries of the Middle East, long-term sustainable economic development will

depend in large part upon access to clean and dependable supplies of freshwater. Access to water, in turn, will depend upon regionwide comprehensive management of the shared major river and ground-water basins. Although new sources of water may eventually be developed, cooperation over the existing water

resources is essential: unless current water supplies are equitably and efficiently allocated and used, agreements to enlarge the overall pie will he stymied.

Enormous differences remain among the parties. Jordan still has a serious dispute with Syria over

the damming of and withdrawals from the Yarmuk River; no formal agreements on water rights have been worked out between the Palestinians and Israelis; Turkey, Syria, and Iraq have no formal treaty allocating the waters of the Euphrates; and rapidly growing populations throughout the region are competing for an

inadequate overall water supply, raising unanswered questions about the costs of alternative water sources.

At the broadest level, the Middle East needs a comprehensive framework for planning and managing

shared water resources. If necessary, such a framework could be convened by third-party nations and institutions and include regional and national studies on water supply and demand, the development of standards for the collection and dissemination of data, the establishment of Jordan and Euphrates river

basin authorities with representation from all of the people dependent on those water resources, and the identification of mechanisms for implementing joint projects. Some of the goals of a framework water convention would include identifying minimum water requirements and the equitable allocation of water;

water-use efficiency capabilities and goals; means for shifting water use within and among sectors, such as through water «banks» or marketing; and objectives for providing new supplies. The opportunity for conflict over water in the Middle East is high, but peaceful, effective cooperation remains a goal worth striving for.

 

box 1. WATER AND THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE TALKS

by Peter Yolles and Peter H.Gleick

Peter Yolles is a research assistant at the Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, Environment and Security, based in Oakland, California. Peter H. Gleick is the director of the Pacific Institute's Global Environment Program.

Water is such an important aspect of the international relationships in the Middle East that it has been made an explicit part of the ongoing peace talks. There are two tracks to these talks, the bilateral talks and

the multilateral talks. The official goal of the bilateral negotiations is a «just, lasting, and cornprehensive peace». These talks are where the major political  questions are being worked out in meetings between Israel and each of the other interests in the area. The major water issues in the bilateral talks are defining

and securing appropriate shares of water rights. Discussion of the prime question of control of water and water rights was originally part of the multilateral talks but was recently moved to the bilateral talks. In the

Israeli-Jordanian bilateral talks, a subcommittee on «Water, Energy, and Environment» was formed, and a subcommittee on «Land and Water» has been formed for the Israeli-Palestinian talks.

There are five separate working groups in the multilateral talks: Refugees, Anns Control and Regional

Security, Economic Development, Environment, and Water. A steering committee oversees the work of these groups and provides links with the ongoing bilateral talks. In the water talks of the multilaterals, practical questions of regional cooperation are under discussion with all interested governmental parties.

These questions include how to alleviate short-term and long-term water shortages, how to increase overall water supplies, and what institutions could enhance data sharing, conflict resolution, and river basin management. Four sets of multilateral water negotiations have already been held in Vienna (May 1992),

Washington, D.C. (September 1992), Geneva (April 1993), and Beijing (October 1993). The next set is being held this month in Oman. The water track of the multilaterals is the only one to have successfully produced a signed agreement: to cooperate on a series of formal and informal «activities» around supply

 questions, data sharing, and institution building. These activities began in summer 1993 and are continuing.

In addition to the formal peace talks now under way, there is an informal track of separate independent, unofficial discussions. These are often academic meetings, workshops, and conferences. Among the recent

meetings have been an Israeli-Palestinian conference in Zurich in December 1992; an academic workshop on the multilaterals held at the University of California at Los Angeles in April 1993, which included dellegates from Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinians; a meeting in Champagne/Urbana, Illinois, sponsored by

the International Water Resources Association in October 1993; and a Pugwash Conference on Middle East issues held outside of Stockholm in December 1993.

These meetings provide an unofficial forum for broaching ideas and exchanging information, and they

are considered extremly fruitful both for the ideas that are raised and for the relationships that are formed. Several of the ideas that have made their way into the recent formal agreements between Israel and the Palestinians and Israel and Jordan orignated at these unofficial meetings. These ideas include the goal

ofequetable utilization, the supply of minimum water requirements to existing inhabitants, and the need to examine certain new supply options.                                            

box 2. CONFLICTS OVER WATER IN THE MYTHS, LEGENDS, AND ANCIENT HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST

by Haleh Hatami and Peter H. Gleick

The history of water-related disputes in the Middle East goes back to antiquity and is described in the many myths, legends, and historical accounts that have survived from earlier times. These disputes range

5   from conflicts  over access to adequate water supplies to intentional attacks on water delivery systems during wars. A chronology of such water-related conflicts in the Tigris and Euphrates river valleys during the last 5,000 years appears on the facing page.

One of the earliest examples of the use of water as a weapon is the ancient Sumerian myth — which parallels the Biblical account of Noah and the deluge-recounting the deeds of the diety Ea, who punishes humanity's sins by inflicting the. Earth with a great flood. According to the Sumerians, the pa

triarch Utu speaks with Ea, who warns him of the impending flood and orders him to build a large vessel filled with «all the seeds of life».

 A dispute between the city-states of Umma and Lagash over the fertile soils of Mesopotamia between

the modern-day Tigris and Euphrates Rivers continued from 2500 to 2400 B.C. and included conflicts over irrigation systems and the intentional diversion of water supplies. Continuing disputes over water in the region later led Hammurabi of Babylon (around 11790 B.C.) to include several laws in the famous «Code

of Hammurabi» pertaining to the negligence of irrigation systems and to water theft.

Many Biblical accounts include descriptions of the use of water as an instrument of conflict, including the banishment of Hagar and Ishmael to the wilderness with only a limited amount of water and their

divine salvation when God leads them to a well (Genesis 21:1-23). According to Islam, Ishmael's offspring Constitute the nation of Islam; a similar Quranic verse parallels this Biblical account. The well, called Zum Zum, is thought to be located at Mecca. Exodus recounts the miracle of Moses  parting the Red Sea or,

alternatively, damming a tributary of the Nile to prevent the Egyptians from reaching the Jews as they journeyed through the Sinai. In Chronicles 32:3, Hezekiah jdigs a well outside the walls of Jerusalem and uses a conduit to bring in water to prepare for a siege by Sennacherib. By cutting off water supplies outside

of the city walls, Jerusalem survives the attack.

Other historical accounts offer fascinating insights into the role of water in war and politics. Sargon II, the Assyrian king from 720 to 705 B.C., destroyed the intricate irrigation network of the Haldians after his

45 successful campaign through Armenia. Sennacherib of Assyria devastated Babylon in 689 В. С. as retribution for the death of his son and intentionally destroyed the water supply canals to the city. Assurbanipal, King of Assyria from 669 to 626 В С., seized water wells as part of his strategy of desert

warfare against Arabia. According to inscriptions recorded during the reign of Esarhaddon (681-669 B.C.), the Assyrians besieged the city of Tyre, cutting off food and water. In another account, in 612 B.C., a coalition ofi Egyptian, Median (Persian), and Babylonian forces attacked and destroyed Ninevah, the

capital of Assyria, by diverting the Khosr River to create a flood.

Nebuchadnezzar (605-562 B.C.) built immense walls around Babylon and used the Euphrates River and a series of canals as defensive moats surrounding the inner castle. Describing Nebuchadnezzar's plan to

60  create an impregnable city, the ancient historian Berossus states, «He arranged it so that be siegers would no longer be able to divert the river against the city by surrounding the inner city with three circuits of  walls».

65      In one of the most intriguing legends, Herodotus describes how Cyrus the Great successfully invaded Babylon in 539 B.C. by diverting the Euphrates River above the city into the desert and marching his troops into the city along the dry riverbed.

THE PARTIAL CHRONOLOGY OF CONFLICT OVER WATER IN THE ANCIENT MIDEAST

3000 B.C. - The Flood

An ancient Sumerian legend recounts the deeds of the diety Ea, who punishes humanity for its sins by inflicting the Earth with a six-day storm. The Sumerian myth parallels the Biblical account of Noah and the deluge, although some details differ.

2500 В. С.-Lagash-Umma Border Dispute

The dispute over the «Gu'edena» (edge of paradise) region begins. Uriama, King of Lagash from 2450 to 2400 B.C., diverts water from this region to boundary canals, drying up boundary ditches to deprive Umma of water. His son II cuts off the water supply to Girsu, a city in Umma.

1790 B.C.— Code of Hammurabi for the State of Sumer

Hammurabi lists several laws pertaining to irrigation that provide for possible negligence of irrigation systems and water theft.

1720-1684 B.C. - Abi-Eshuh v. Iluma-Ilum

A grandson of Hammurabi, Abish or Abi-Eshuh, dams the Tigris to prevent the retreat of rebels led by Iluma-Ilum, who declared independence of Babylon. This failed attempt marks  the decline of the Sumerians who had reached their apex under Hammurabi.

1200 B.C.-Moses and the Parting of the Red Sea

When Moses and the retreating Jews find themselves trapped between the pharaoh's army and the Red Sea, Moses miracu, lously parts the waters of the Red Sea, allowing his followers to escape. The waters close behind them and cut off the Egyptians.

720-705 B.C.—Sargon II Destroys Armenian Waterworks

After a successful campaign against the Haldians of Armenia, Sargon II of Assyria destroys their intricate irrigation network and floods their land.

705-682 B.C. -Sennacherib and the Fall of Babylon

In quelling rebellious Assyrians in 695 B.C., Sennacherib razes Babylon and diverts one of the principal irrigation canals so that its waters wash over the ruins.

Sennacherib and Hezekiah

As recounted in Chronicles 32:3, Hezekiah digs a well outside the walls of Jerusalem and uses a conduit to bring in water. Preparing for a possible siege by Sennacherib, he cuts off water supplies outside of the city walls, and Jerusalem survives the attack.

681-669 B.C. — Esarhaddon and the Siege of Tyre

Esarhaddon, an Assyrian, refers to an earlier period when gods, angered by insolent mortals, create a destructive flood. According to inscriptions recorded during his reign, Esarhaddon besieges Tyre, cutting off food and water.

669-626 B.C.-Assurbanipal, Siege of Tyre, Drying of Wells

Assurbanipal's inscriptions also refer to a siege against Tyre, although scholars attribute it to Esarhaddon. In campaigns against both Arabia and Elam in 645 B.C., Assurbanipal, son of Esarhaddon, dries up wells to deprive Elamite troops. He also guards wells from Arabian fugitives in an earlier Arabian war. On his return from victorious battle against Elam, Assurbanipal floods the city of Sapibel, an ally of Elam. According to inscriptions, he dams the Ulai River with the bodies of dead Elamite soldiers and deprives dead Elamite kings of their food and water offerings.

612 B.C. — Fall of Ninevah in Assyria and the Khosr River

A coalition of Egyptian, Median (Persian), and Babylonian forces attacks and destroys Ninevah, the capital of Assyria Nebuchadnezzar's father, Nebopolassar, leads the Babylonians. The converging armies divert the Khosr River to create a flood, which allows them to elevate their siege engines on rafts.

605-562 B.C. — Nebuchadnezzar Uses Water to Defend Babylon

Nebuchadnezzar builds immense walls around Babylon, using the Euphrates and canals as defensive moats surrounding the inner castle.

558-528 B.C.—Cyrus the Graet Digs 360 Canals

 

On his way from Sardis to defeat Nabonidus at Babylon,  Cyrus faces a powerful tributary of the Tigris, probably the Diyalah. According to Herodotus's account, the river drowns his royal white horse and presents a formidable obstacle to his march. Cyrus, angered by the «insolence» of the river, halts his army and orders them to cut 360 canals to divert the river's  flow. Other historians argue that Cyrus needed the water to maintain his troops on their southward journey, while another  asserts that the construction was an attempt to win the confidence of the locals.

539 B.C.—Cyrus the Great Invades Babylon

 

According to Herodotus, Cyrus invades Babylon by diverting the Euphrates above the city and marching troops along the dry riverbed. This popular account describes a midnight attack that coincided with a Babylonian feast.

 

355-323 B.C.—Alexander the Great Destroys Persian Dams

 

Returning from the razing of Persepolis, Alexander proceeds to India. After the Indian campaigns, he heads back to Babylon via the Persian Gulf and Tigris, where he tears down defensive weirs that the Persians had constructed along the river. Arrian describes Alexander's disdain for the Persians' attempt to block navigation, which he saw as «unbecoming to  men who are victorious in battle».

From Environment, 1994, Vol 36, Number 3.

 


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